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Is the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
Outmoded?
Robert M. Debevec*
-Definitions and History

T

has evolved from
the so-called turntable cases, holds that one who maintains
instrumentalities or appliances on his premises of a character
likely to attract children in play, is liable to such children when
they are injured therefrom.
The doctrine was formulated in Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout in 18731 although the ground had been prepared
by the decision in Lynch v. Nurdin in 18412 and Washington and
3
Georgetown Railroad Co. v. Gladman in 1872.
In the Stout case, supra, the defendant maintained a railroad
turntable on which children had previously been seen to play.
The facts showed that the defendant had forbidden children to
play on the premises. A latch used for locking the turntable was
broken and therefore inoperative. The plaintiff was playing on
the turntable when he was injured.
In the first trial of this case, which ended in a jury disagreement, there was no question of the defendant maintaining an
"attractive nuisance." The issue was whether or not the defendant was negligent in not safeguarding the turntable. The defendant alleged contributory negligence.
The second trial, in which the defendant did not bring up
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The issue in the second trial was the liability
of a landowner to an infant trespasser for injuries resulting from
defendant's unsafe turntable. In this second trial, Judge Dillon
charged that the defendant would be liable if he knew or had
good reason to believe that children would play upon the turntable and if they possibly might be injured because it was left in
an unlocked condition.
HE "ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE" DOCTRINE which

* The writer, a senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, has had several
articles published in national magazines. At present, he is Clerk of Court
at Euclid, Ohio Municipal Court. His undergraduate work was done at
John Carroll University and Cleveland College.
1 17 Wall. (U. S.) 657; L. Ed. 745 (1873).
2 1 Q. B. 29 (1841).
3 15 Wall. (U. S.) 401 (1872).
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This case did not create any immediate stir in the courts, but
the number of cases using it as a basis for finding liability against
landowners in favor of trespassing children increased tremendously in succeeding years. Although the courts relied on the
Stout case for precedent, the issue of defendant's maintaining a
"trap" or "allurement" for children actually became the basis
for most of these later decisions.
Many jurists became alarmed at the number of cases being
decided in favor of the trespassing children and being justified
by such phrases as "the defendant had invited, allured, or enticed" the children to come upon his premises and therefore subjected them to the perils of the property.
In Townsend v. Wathen in 1808, 4 the defendant laid out traps
with decayed meat for the purpose of attracting and capturing
neighbor's dogs.
Many courts applied this case to the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine, saying that the child has been "allured or enticed" upon
the premises "as a bait attracts a fish or a piece of stinking meat
5
draws a dog."
Around the turn of the century, Jeremiah Smith in his article, "Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without
Permission" 6 wrote with alarm that "the natural meaning of
these strong expressions is that the landowner actually intended
and desired that the children should come upon his land, and
that the changes on his premises were made by him for the express purpose of attracting children to encounter peril ...But no
sane man believes that people who are making beneficial use of
their own land do in fact entertain the intention of thereby
alluring children to their destruction."
It was thought that judicial opinion was gradually beginning
to set against R. R. Co. v. Stout as a result of two cases: United
Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt 7 and N. Y. N. H. and H. R. R. Co.
8
v. Fruchter.
In the Zinc Co. v. Britt case, the plaintiff's two sons lost their
lives while swimming in an abandoned pool owned by defendants,

4 9 East 277, 9 R.R. 553 (1808).

5 1 Thompson, Negligence (1st
Horton, 117 Ark. 1, 173 S. W. 423
der Mining Co., 192, 45 Nev. 25,
6 11 Harv. L. Rev., 349 (1897-8).
7 258 U. S.268 (1922).
8 260 U. S.141, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep.

ed. 1886), 305; Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v.
(1915); Williams Estate Co. v. Nevada Won196 P. 844 (1921).

38 (1922).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol5/iss2/2

2

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE OUTMODED?

which had become poisoned. In this case Justice Holmes said
that "if the children had been adults, they would have had no
case," and that "infants have no greater rights upon other people's
land than adults." Justice Holmes also brought out the point that
the decedents had entered the premises without knowing that the
pool of water was there and therefore could not have been
"allured" to it.
In the N. Y. N. H. and H. R. R. Co. v. Fruchter case, the
plaintiff climbed to the top girder of a city-owned bridge and
touched the defendant's wire, thereby injuring himself. Justice
McReynolds in the Supreme Court held for the defendant because "if the plaintiff had been an adult, he could not recover."
However, these two decisions were much criticized and the
courts continued to hold with R. R. Co. v. Stout until at the
present time, a minority of only seven jurisdictions, including
some of the leading industrial states of the country, still refuse
to accept the "attractive nuisance" doctrine. These jurisdictions
are Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Vermont and Virginia.
Modern Trends
Professor William L. Prosser wrote in 19419 that although
the landowner had no liability towards an adult trespasser, there
was an important reason why this was not so when the trespasser
was a child: The child is incapable of understanding and appreciating all the possible dangers resulting from his trespass.
Prosser goes on to say that the parent or guardian cannot be
expected to look out for the child at all times, and this duty
should naturally fall on "the one upon whose land he strays, and
the interest in unrestricted freedom to make use of the land may
be required, within reasonable limits, to give way to the greater
social interest in the safety of the child."
The Restatement of Torts, #339, requires that four conditions be satisfied before there can be any liability:
1. The owner must have reason to believe that the children
are likely to trespass, either because they have done so before
or the danger is located in a place easily accessible to children.
2. The owner should know and recognize that the condition
involves an unreasonable risk to children.
9 Handbook of the Law of Torts, p. 617 (1941).
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3. It must be shown that the child was incapable of appreciating the risk involved.
4. The risk to the child must be overwhelming compared to
the benefit the owner derives from the condition.
Not all of the jurisdictions which rule in favor of the plaintiff
have used the "attractive nuisance" doctrine as a basis for finding liability. A typical example was Bicandi et ux v. Boise Payette Lumber Co.1° In this case, the plaintiff's decedent entered
upon defendant's premises to play on logs floating in the mill
pond there, and while so engaged, he slipped off and was drowned.
The facts showed that defendant's watchman knew of the boy's
presence. The court held that since this was the case, the decedent was no longer a trespasser and the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine therefore did not apply. However, the defendant was
negligent in not using the reasonable care due an invitee. (The
lack of reasonable care was in permitting the boy to play on the
dangerous logs.)
The tendency in the majority of jurisdictions is to find liability even when, by any stretch of the imagination, it is impossible
to find any "attraction." In Foster v. Lusk" and City of South
Bend v. Turner,12 the child never even discovered the thing that
injured him.
The jurisdictions still holding out against the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine have used various reasons for reaching their
decisions.
In Urban v. Central Massachusetts Electric Co.13 the court
held that there was an obvious trespass and there could be no
liability since the entire "attractive nuisance doctrine was nothing
but a piece of sentimental humanitarianism which was founded
on sympathy rather than law and logic."
Ohio Doctrine
The Ohio courts have been almost unanimous in repudiating
this doctrine although there are a few cases which lean the other
way:
In Harrimanv. Pittsburgh, C. and St. L. R. Co.14 the court
10 55 Idaho 543, 44 P. 2d 1103 (1935).

11 129 Ark. 1, 194 S. W. 855 (1917).
12 156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 (1901).
13 301 Mass. 519, 17 N. E. 2d 718 (1938).
14 45 0. S. 11, 12 N. E. 451, 4 Am. St. Rep. 507 (1887).
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held that it was negligence on the part of the defendant to allow
an apparently harmless, but in reality dangerous object, such
as a signal torpedo, to be placed in a locality where it was easily
picked up and handled by children and where children were
likely to be attracted (italics ours) to it.
In Ann Arbor R. Co. v. Kinz15 the court said, in referring to
the Harriman case, "we think the better and more reasonable
proposition is that the owner of property owes no general duty
to keep it in condition which will insure the safety of persons
who go upon it without invitation or license; yet if he keeps upon
his premises dangerous machinery, or other things likely to attract (italics ours) children, and does not guard them to prevent
injuries to them, he is liable for injuries resulting from his neglect
to provide such guards."
In Scherman v. Allard 6 the court held that it was not necessary to determine whether or not the steps and porch where the
plaintiff fell were within the law of an attractive nuisance, "although the facts do suggest the rule."
The Court held in Rognon v. Zanesville17 that where a child
was hurt while playing on a road-grader the real issue was
whether or not the road-grader was an attractive nuisance and
not whether the plaintiff was a trespasser.
In Cleveland Electric Illuminating v. Van Benshoten' s the
Court commented in favor of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.
The plaintiff was an adult who had used a toilet erected by the
defendant in a public street for the use of its workmen. The
building was placed over an open sewer, and escaping sewer gas
exploded when the plaintiff lit a match in the building. The court
said, "Had the case been one where children of tender years had
been attracted to the building and become injured in the same
manner, the principle of attractive nuisance might apply . . ."
Most Ohio courts hold, however, that a trespassing child is
no different than a trespassing adult in ordinary cases. 19 In Han68 0. S. 210, 67 N. E. 479 (1903).
16 19 0. App. 374 (1923).
17 24 0. App. 536, 157 N. E. 299 (1926).
18 120 0. S. 438, 442 (1929).
19 Wheeling R. Co. v. Hawey, 77 0. S. 235, 250; 83 N. E. 66, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1136, 122 Am. St. 503, 11 Ann. Cas. 1981 (1907); Baker-Evans Ice
Cream Co. v. Tedesco, 114 0. S. 170, 150 N. E. 745, 44 A. L. R. 430 (1926);
Wabash R. Co. v. Norway, 7 C. C. 449; 4 C. D. 674 (1893); Steele v. Pittsburgh, C., C. etc. R. Co., 4 0. D. 350 (1895); Sharp Realty Co. v. Forsha,
122 0. S. 368, 171 N. E. 598 (1930).
15
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nan v. Ehrlich2° plaintiff's decedent was a boy eight years of age.
The defendant owned and operated a sand pit which had been excavated to a great depth. In places, the banks of the pit were
almost vertical due to the constant excavation. The defendant
was aware that children used the premises and played in the
excavation. The child was killed when the sides of the pit collapsed and fell.
The court held that since the plaintiff's decedent was a trespasser, the defendant owed him no duty except to refrain from
wilful wrongdoing. The court went on to say that the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine had no application in Ohio, and the most
favorable construction of the allegation that the defendant allowed the children to play on the premises would be that the boy
was a licensee. The court said that if this were so, the licensor
still owes no duty to the licensee except to refrain from wantonly
or wilfully injuring him.
However, the court made the point in this case that greater
care and caution would have to be exercised to prevent injuries
to children upon premises where dangerous active operations are
carried on than upon premises containing a visibly dangerous
statical condition.
In Ohio the law is fairly well laid down that although the
"attractive nuisance" doctrine does not apply when an infant
comes upon the premises without invitation, the owner does become liable if the condition of the premises is made perilous "by
the active and negligent operation thereof by the owner."' 21
In Ziehm v. Vale 22 the defendant was aware that the plaintiff,
an infant, four and a half years old, was in the proximity of his
car since he had tried to drive the plaintiff away from it several
times. The court held that under such circumstances the condition had become an active perilous one when the defendant
drove the car away, and he was required to use ordinary care to
avoid injuring the child.
Another exception to the rule in Ohio is where the dangerous
28
condition exists in a public place.
102 0. S. 176, 131 N. E. 504 (1921).
21 29 0. Jur. 58, p. 460.
22 98 0. S. 306, 120 N. E. 702, 1 A. L. R. 1381 (1918).
23 Zimanski v. Curro etc. Co., 6 0. L. A. 117 (1928). (Rule that defendant
owes no duty to child who comes upon premises without invitation is held
not to apply to machinery left in public street.)
20
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2 4
In Isaac Leisy Brewing Co. v. Kap1
the defendant had
temporarily placed a bar fixture on the sidewalk and the plaintiff was injured when it fell on him while he was playing with it.
The court said that the defendant was liable "because this was a
public street, where the child had a right to be, and where it was
to be expected that small children would exercise their childish
instincts."

Conclusions
The history of the "attractive nuisance" rule shows that it
stemmed from the turntable cases because the courts felt that an
owner of a contrivance of this nature was negligent in not keeping it locked when he realized that small children would play
on it.
From this shaky proposition of law was built the even shakier
structure of the "attractive nuisance." There was no longer any
question of the owner failing to repair a lock on a turntable, but
the mere fact that the instrumentality or appliance was there
became enough to find the owner liable towards trespassing
children.
The place that this concept of the law has in modern times
is certainly questionable. In this day of Nike sites, subways with
their platforms and stairways, coal-conveyor systems, helioports
and other mechanical devices located in and near residential
areas, it is humanly impossible to guard against every trespassing
child. To make such locations completely child-proof would
negative any benefit the owner or the public might derive from
it because the costs of operation would become prohibitive.
Certainly it is not being anti-social to submit that the parent
or guardian should be the primary source of guidance in instructing and teaching children which areas are safe and which are
unsafe for play. The responsibility should be on them to know
where the child is playing or going to play and the negligence or
lack of care or neglect of duty should be charged against the
parent or guardian when they allow their ward to play in an
unsafe area.
Perhaps when the turntable cases originated, parents and
children both may have been ignorant of the possible dangers
inherent in some of the new mechanical devices just then beginning to be used. This cannot be presented as an excuse now be24

22 0. C. C. N. S. 309 (1908).
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cause of the wide dissemination of information through radio,
television, books and newspapers and especially because of our
modern compulsory public school programs. Every parent or
guardian at least, is fully cognizant of the dangers involved in
any modern contrivance, and it is incumbent upon him not to
permit his ward to play where the danger is present.
There is no reason to believe that any landowner would ever
completely ignore the fact that children may come upon his land,
either as licensees or as trespassers. He would naturally take
reasonable precautions to protect them as well as any similar
adults who may be there. But the "attractive nuisance" doctrine
which makes the fact that the child was injured practically prima
facie evidence of the landowner's liability certainly has no place
in this modern world.
The Ohio law, whereby the landowner is required to use
care when active operations are in progress or when the contrivance is in a public place, is the better and more reasonable
law. It not only protects the child from reckless landowners but
also gives some thought to the owner who is trying to derive
some benefit from his property.
The "attractive nuisance" doctrine as such should be discarded and each case decided on its own merits with due regard
given to whether or not the child was or was not a trespasser.
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